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ABSTRACT
Chairperson: Soazig Le Bihan
Committee Member: Albert Borgmann
Committee Member: Christopher Preston
Committee Member: Dane Scott
Dissent, criticism and controversy are integral to scientific practice, especially when we consider
science as a communal enterprise. However, not every form of dissent is acceptable in science.
The aim of this paper is to characterize what constitutes the kind of dissent that impedes the
growth of knowledge, in other words epistemically detrimental dissent (EDD), and apply that
analysis to climate science. I argue that the intrusion of non-epistemic considerations is
inescapable in climate science and other policy-relevant sciences. As such there is the need to
look beyond the presence of non-epistemic factors (such as non-epistemic risks and economic
interests) when evaluating cases of dissent in policy-relevant science. I make the claim that the
stable factors in the production of are the presence of skewed research and the effective
dissemination of this ‘research’ to the public; the intrusion of non-epistemic values and
consideration is only a contingent enabling factor.
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INTRODUCTION
In the epistemic context of scientific practice, ‘dissent’ refers to “the act of objecting to a
particular conclusion, especially one that is widely held” (Biddle and Leuschner 2015, 262). In
that context, dissent is taken to be epistemically valuable on the basis that humans are not
infallible knowers, and that an ideal scientific community encourages diverse opinions, interests
and research directions in view of arriving at good theories. Dissenting views are valuable since
they expand the epistemic reach of the community in terms of covering more ground in the
theoretical space of a given domain.
Nevertheless, not all dissenting views actually contribute positively to this. Certain cases
of dissent actually impede the growth of knowledge in science; in other words, epistemically
detrimental dissent (EDD). The challenge is to characterize what constitutes EDD. In policyrelevant science, such as climate science, where non-epistemic considerations play significant
roles in scientific practice, it is often tempting to evaluate cases of dissent on the basis of what
non-epistemic factors such as economic agenda or interests played any roles in research.
In recent times, climate science has enjoyed a lot of attention from both scientists and
non-scientists as a result of its bearing on the economy and policy. As such, it is not surprising
that a lot of the dissenting views generated in the discipline are often considered to be laden with
political and economic motives. However, it should be noted that having a political/economic
agenda does not necessarily make dissent epistemically detrimental. Many philosophers agree
that influence from non-epistemic values is unavoidable in, and integral to, scientific practice.
This is an indication that understanding epistemically detrimental dissent in climate science goes
beyond the political and economic interests associated with research in the discipline.
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In this work, I shall attempt to characterize Epistemically Detrimental Dissent (EDD)1
and apply it to climate science. Le Bihan & Amadi (forthcoming) provide an analysis of EDD.
Our characterization of EDD concedes that non-epistemic considerations could be significant
factors in the production of EDD, but that it needs not be the case. I shall present the arguments
in a concise form and apply that to the discipline of climate science. I will argue that the
presence of non-epistemic values should not be the basis for evaluating a dissenting view in
scientific practice. I shall make the claim that the decisive factors are the presence of skewed
research and malpractices, as well as the effective dissemination of the skewed research to the
public thereby engendering a manufactured controversy.
The first section of the paper will mainly be an expository discussion of the discipline of
climate science. I shall try to identify some of the challenges in the discipline that include
modeling limitations, parameterization, and uncertainty. Note that this is not an exhaustive list of
the epistemic issues that the discipline grapples with today. However, I shall emphasize that
these challenges notwithstanding, there is a wide consensus on the validity of the knowledge
base of the science among climate scientists. I shall also present the characterization of EDD and
outline the main claim – that the stable factors in the causal landscape of EDD are the production
of skewed research and the effective dissemination of same to the public.
What follow in the rest of the paper will be a discussion of these two factors and an
application of this analysis to the field of climate science. The second section focuses on the
presence of non-epistemic factors in science and its relationship to the production of skewed
research, with a particular focus on climate science. I shall argue that the history of science
shows that the intrusion of non-epistemic considerations is common in science. I shall concede
1

Le Bihan & Amadi (2016) provides a deeper analysis of EDD. In this work, I shall present the arguments
in a concise form and apply that to the discipline of climate science. REDUNDANT
v

that the role of these factors tends to go deeper in the issues-based sciences such as climate
science; however, I think that it is not sufficient to use that as a basis for rejecting dissenting
views. Rather, it shows that the presence of non-epistemic considerations seems to be inevitable.
As such, it becomes pertinent to look beyond the intrusion of non-epistemic considerations in our
evaluation and characterization of EDD. I shall apply this claim to the discipline of climate
science. I concede that there are unacceptable cases of intrusion of non-epistemic factors
(funding, risks, economic interests, etc.). Nevertheless, the production of skewed research is a
stable factor; we do not need to resolve the debate on what roles non-epistemic values play in
order to adjudicate that a research study is skewed.
In the third section, I shall go into our discussion of science as a collective enterprise in
the bid to highlight that the effective public dissemination of skewed research is a stable factor in
the characterization of EDD. The next section deals with the discussion of S Fred Singer’s role in
the climate change debate as a possible candidate of a case of EDD.
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SECTION ONE
1.0 THE STATE OF CLIMATE SCIENCE
In this section, the main focus is on the discipline of climate science; some issues and
challenges associated with climate modeling will be discussed, as well as the problem of
uncertainty. Then I shall highlight that there is still a large consensus among scientists despite the
various challenges that characterize the discipline.
1.1 UNDERSTANDING CLIMATE AND CLIMATE CHANGE
It seems fitting to start this paper with a brief discussion on climate. I shall point out the
difficulty in defining the concepts of climate and climate change. It shall be taken for granted
that anthropogenic climate change is an issue that demands attention. However, I shall not focus
on the debates on the anthropogenic and non-anthropogenic distinction in the attribution of
climate change and the implications to our attitude towards global warming and climate change
in general.
Climate is different from weather condition in the sense that characterizing climate takes
into account the atmospheric conditions over a long period of time. Weather on the other hand
usually refers to the condition of the atmosphere within a relatively short period of time, perhaps
at a particular point in time or, say, a day. As such, we could say in a loose sense that the climate
condition of a place is the statistical mean of the weather condition over an extended period of
time. Frigg et al. (2015a) argue that defining climate is nontrivial, and most definitions of climate
usually fall under either one of two kinds. The first emphasizes climate as distribution over time
while the second definition sees climate as ensemble distribution. By ensemble distribution is
meant “the distribution quantifying how likely it is that certain values of the climate variables are
expected at a certain point of time in the future given our current uncertainty about the climate
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variables” (Frigg et al. 2015a, 953).2 This typology does not take away the fact that defining
climate has proven to be a difficult task among scholars.
To characterize climate entails taking into account certain variables including
temperature, precipitation, humidity, CO2 concentrations, atmospheric pressure, etc. of the
atmosphere, the ocean, and the cryosphere.3 These climatic variables are determined by several
elements such as topography, vegetation, volcanic eruptions, presence of water bodies, etc. Thus,
the variables usually result from the relationship between these elements, and this relationship is
often difficult to characterize. All these physical factors taken together are linked in a complex
relationship that determines climate, and scientists try to understand and attempt to characterize
climatic behavior.
There is a debate on the problem of appropriately characterizing both the detection and
attribution of climate change.4 The complexity in the composition and the functioning of the
climate system has significant consequences for determining the cause(s) of climate change.
Studies (Kroll, 1864; Ogg et al., 2004) have shown that the earth has experienced several
different climatic epochs in the past. These studies provide climatic records that go back up to
millions of years in the past. The transition from one climatic epoch to another is termed climate
change. Previous changes in climate conditions are considered to originate in non-anthropogenic
factors, spurring debates on how to characterize such climate evolution. As regards
anthropogenic climate change, the debate takes a different dimension. There is the issue of
2

Frigg et al. (2015a) argue that arriving at a precise definition of climate is nontrivial and contentious. After
discussing five popular definitions and their inherent problems, they favor the definition given by Werndl (2015)
that “the climate is the finite distribution over time of the climate variables arising under a certain regime of
varying external conditions (given the initial states).” They argue that it is the definition which faces the fewest
problems.
3
The state of the cryosphere is the state of glaciers and ice sheets. That it counts among the relevant climatic
variables is shown by the fact that it was included in the IPCC 2013 report.
4
See Frigg et al. (2015a, 958-959)
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whether the anthropogenic and non-anthropogenic distinction is necessary and significant. This,
in some sense, has consequences for determining what the appropriate attitude towards
anthropogenic climate change should be; such that the argument could be made that if climate
change due to a volcanic eruption is natural, then there should be no negative attitude towards
anthropogenic climate change since human activity is a part of the earth’s dynamics. However, I
shall not concern myself with that in this paper. Instead, it is taken for granted here that
anthropogenic climate change deserves significant attention. That said, we are faced with the
questions of the reality or otherwise of anthropogenic climate change, of how confident we are in
the science of climate change and, of what should count as good science in establishing or
denying the claim that the current change in climatic conditions are caused by human activity.
1.2 CLIMATE MODELING: COMPLEXITY AND PARAMETERIZATION
The climate system is a complex one and scientists try to understand the interactions of
the various components with the help of modeling simulations. This section focuses on the
challenges associated with modeling and tries to identify why it has proven difficult for climate
models to narrow down their projections of future climate scenarios.
The complexity of the climate system lies in the fact that the complex relationship
between the various components of the system is non-linear; there are several variables which
interact in numerous possible ways, and it might prove challenging to adequately capture these
interactions. In a nonlinear system, unlike a linear system, any modification in the initial state
does not necessarily amount to a proportional modification at the latter stage. Rasband (2015, 2)
writes that “(N)onlinearity in a system simply means that the measured values of the properties
of a system in a later state depend in a complicated way on the measured values in an earlier
state.” By complicated Rasband (2015, 2) means something “other than just proportional to,
3

differing by a constant, or some combination of these two.” These (proportional to and differing
by a constant) denote linear relations, i.e. a linear relation is of the type: x(t)=ax(t0)+b, in which
x and y are the variables, and a and b are constants.
It is no surprise then that scientifically representing a complex dynamical system such as
the climate is nontrivial. In science, complex dynamical systems are usually characterized with
the use of models, and models assume a central role in many scientific contexts (Vespignani
2012; Petersen 1999; Frigg and Hartmann 2006). A scientific model could be said to be
simplified representation of a physical system which is too complicated to study in detail. The
climate system is complex, and very challenging to study in detail. Scientists design models to
simulate the climate system in a simplified form in the bid to understand the system. This
simplification is an essential aspect of modeling because complex target system (the physical
system of interest) often has numerous parameters and variables that cannot all be included in the
model design. As such, it is pertinent to simulate the system by simplifying the models in a way
that is intended to preserve the essential features of the system of interest (Levins 1966, 421). It
is important to state that scientific models should not be confused with the material objects or
mathematical objects that constitute their makeup. There are various issues associated with the
concept of models and modeling. For instance, there is the ontological problem of properly
characterizing what models are, and an epistemological question of how models represent their
target objects. However, these discussions are not a concern in this paper. I take it for granted
that models are useful in the study of complex phenomena such as the climate system. Modeling
has been largely successful in the quest to adequately represent the climate system. For instance,
as just mentioned, it is impossible to carry out real experiments on the climate as a whole. But
with the help of models, we can fairly represent the complex climate system. This places us in a
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position in which we can better understand the things we observe or simulate and to test
hypotheses (Knutti 2008, 4656).
Since it is agreed that modeling is appropriate for understanding and studying climate,
now the question is; how successful has modeling been for climate science? Climate models
have been largely successful in simulating past climatic conditions, especially the climate since
mid-19th century when scientists started keeping climate records and data (Jansen et al., 2007).
Even though in climate science the practice of modeling is also employed in climate prediction,
the success recorded in climate retrodiction does not seem to extend as much to the practice of
climate prediction (Knutti, 2008). Assessing the validity of the predictions made from climate
models has been a contentious issue.
Several reasons could be identified as to why climate predictions from climate modeling
are problematic. Firstly, we are dealing with a complex climate system with several variables
whose complex relationships could result in varying future climate scenarios. The multiple
models in use today largely agree on simulating past climate behavior. But when it comes to
projecting future climate scenarios, their predictions do not seem to strictly converge, and there
is no non-arbitrary way of favoring a particular prediction since all of these models have proven
to be credible, reliable and plausible in climate retrodiction. This is an indication that knowledge
of the climate system is still largely limited and also our modeling techniques are equally limited.
Secondly, as just pointed out, it cannot be assumed that models will make good predictions just
because they have been doing well in simulating and re-presenting the climatic data of the past.
The problem, according to Frigg et al. (2015b, 969), is that “climate projections for high-forcing
scenarios take the system well outside any previously experienced state, and at least prima facie
there is no reason to assume that success in low-forcing contexts is a guide to success in high
5

forcing contexts.” Climate forcings are external influences on the climate system such as
anthropogenic greenhouse gases. IPCC reports (1990, 1992, 1994, and 1995) define a radiative
forcing in terms of the change in the net radiation at the troposphere. Clarke et al. (2007)
identifies six relevant GHG’s in her discussion of radiative forcings viz: carbon dioxide,
methane, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, nitrous oxide and sulfur hexafluoride. Climate
models have successfully simulated the effects of such external influences on past climate.
Climate predictions involve taking into account the projected increase in the intensity of these
influences over the coming decades. The challenge is that many of the variables that are
reproduced in the models are very sensitive, and the dynamics and relationship between these
variables could be described as non-linear and sometimes chaotic. In some systems such as the
climate, the nonlinearity of the variables often makes them subject to a chaotic dynamic.5
Rasband (2015, 2) explains chaotic dynamics in terms of deterministic development with chaotic
outcomes; that is to say that from moment to moment, the system is evolving in a deterministic
way. This is contradistinguished from a random system in that the evolution of the system to the
current state is dependent on the previous state, whereas there is no causal interaction between
the two states in a random system. He asserts that a dynamical chaos is often accompanied by
nonlinearity, and some form of nonlinearity is necessary for chaotic dynamics even though
nonlinear relations are not sufficient for chaos. Furthermore, “A system exhibiting chaotic
dynamics evolves in a deterministic way, but measurements made on the system do not allow the
prediction of the state of the system even moderately far into the future” (Rasband 2015, 2).
As such, in climate modeling, it is difficult to constrain the range of possible future
scenarios. The future scenario is dependent on the change in the current state. Model simulations
5

In one of its reports, the IPCC states: “In climate research and modeling, we should recognise that we are dealing
with a coupled non-linear chaotic system, and therefore that the long-term prediction of future climate states is
not possible.” (see http://ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg1/505.htm)
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of future scenario involve tweaking the variables that represent the current state based on
observed trends. For instance, simulating an increase in the emission of CO2 will increase the
surface temperature resulting from the heat that is trapped in the atmosphere. However, even
though there is a deterministic causal relationship between an increase in CO2 and an increase in
surface temperature, there are other factors difficult to simulate but that could prove significant
to what the future state would be (such as the amount of CO2 that will be absorbed by
vegetation). Thus, it is difficult to capture all these in a rigid way in climate modeling. Different
models arrive at different projections depending on what variables in the current state get
prominence in the simulations and how the values of these variables are measured or arrived at.
This accounts for the disagreements among different model projections of future climatic
conditions.
In order to understand the nature of this problem, it is crucial to point out that modeling
necessarily involves parameterizations that are not theoretically based and to some degree are
arbitrary. Winsberg (2015) defines parameterization as “the method of replacing processes—
ones that are too small-scale or complex to be physically represented in the model— by a more
simple mathematical description. This is as opposed to other processes—e.g., large-scale flow of
the atmosphere—that are calculated at the grid level in accordance with the basic theory.” Global
Climate Models (GCMs) are designed to simulate the climate system as much as possible.
Although it is impossible to represent the system entirely in a model no matter how sophisticated
the model may be, these models try to simulate many different important variables that help in
simulating the dynamics and evolution of the climate system using relevant fundamental
equations. However, certain parameters and variables that are crucial to a climate model are
difficult to measure or quantify with precision. An example discussed by Randall (1989)
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involves cloud parameterization. The radiative effects of clouds, studies show, constitute an
important forcing function for large-scale atmospheric circulations and deep cumulus
convection, and this has been successfully validated by various climate simulations. The amount
of radiative flux that is trapped or radiated by the clouds has a significant impact on the thermal
circulation in the atmosphere and the mid-range cloud towers. However, the increasing
greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations have led to uncertainties in cloud feedback (the retention
and/or radiation dynamics) and this presents serious challenges for making reliable climate
predictions. As such, climatic modeling typically involves parameterization of the process of
cloud feedback as it is no longer easily represented in forcing contexts.
Also, the method of parameterization comes in handy when representing sub-grid
processes. General Circulation Models (GCM) divide the globe into grids and then simulate the
climatic dynamics or evolution using the measurements from the observation of the variables of
interest such as precipitation, temperature, atmospheric pressure, etc. But there are many crucial
aspects of the climate system whose impact is significant to the dynamics of the system yet they
occur on a scale that is much too small to be adequately captured on the grid. Such phenomena
include convective clouds, carbon sequestration from trees, etc. These variables are difficult to
measure or poorly understood, but ignoring them would result in a deeply flawed simulation of
the earth’s climate system. Climate scientists usually try to solve for these cases by “zooming in”
on the global models. Consequently, these variables are parameterized in order to produce a
more complete model simulation that captures the relevant geo-physical relationships. However,
this approach comes with some serious problems. Schiermeier (2010, 285) succinctly captures
the problem thus; “Zooming in from GCMs bears the risk of blowing up any inherent weakness
of the ‘mother’ model. If the model does a poor job of simulating certain atmospheric patterns,
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those errors will be compounded at the regional level. Most experts are therefore cautious when
asked to make regional predictions.” This can be understood as modeling uncertainty. I shall
discuss the issue of uncertainty later in this section.
Randall (1989, 346) points out that parameterization could be approached inductively or
deductively. The inductive approach seeks to “identify intuitively plausible relationships
between the unknowns…and the known variables of the problem.” General rules are then
formulated on the basis of this finite number of particular cases. This approach has been hugely
useful. However, on the flip side, the lack of a theoretical foundation for the parameterizations
that it yields constitutes a fundamental shortcoming. The deductive approach, on the other hand,
“provides a condensed representation of the important physical processes of interest, and so can
give physical insight into the phenomenon being parameterized” (Randall 1989, 346). The
challenge with this approach, according to Randall, is that its applicability depends on the
assumptions being observationally testable.
These issues present a significant challenge for climate projections for two reasons;
firstly, they leave room for questioning the reliability of the model. Secondly, one way to
evaluate the reliability of the models with parameterized variables will be to find out if it makes
valid projections. But climate projections usually span over decades. At the moment, we have to
settle for the fact that arriving at a reliable precise model calibration for climate projections
presents a significant challenge since predictions of future climate change relate to a state never
observed before. The significance of these challenges tends to deepen when we consider that
models do not strongly converge in their projections. The reason, as mentioned earlier, partly lies
in the differences in the choice of variables and values from parameterization since different
models assign relative importance to various components of the climate system. It seems to be an
9

indication that we might not be able to evaluate how much we have advanced in the skill of
climate projection by how better our models have become; at least not yet, perhaps until we have
enough observational evidence.

1.3 CHARACTERIZING THE PROBLEM OF UNCERTAINTY
One thing we notice from our discussion on parameterization is that some of the values
for the various variables and parameters that climate scientists work with are uncertain, and this
has significant consequences for modeling practices and climate projections. As pointed out
earlier, the complex nature and the dynamics of the climate system make it difficult to assign
precise probabilities to the possible climate scenarios that climate models predict. In fact,
according to the IPCC (2013, 141), “The complexity of the Earth system means that future
climate could follow many different scenarios, yet still be consistent with current understanding
and models.” Despite the recorded successes of models in climate retrodiction, it does not seem
to follow that model climate projections will be equally successful. The wide range of possible
climate scenarios tends to make uncertainty (at least in certain forms) an inevitable phenomenon
in climate science. As such the issue of uncertainty is central to the climate science debate. In
this section, I shall try to characterize what uncertainty in climate science means and the
challenges associated with it. I shall also identify and briefly discuss the types of uncertainty. I
shall make the claim that scientists are aware of the challenges posed by the issue of uncertainty
in climate modeling and keep trying to find ways of managing the issue.
Frigg et al (2015b, 970) highlight that the term ‘uncertainty’ describes a situation
whereby relevant probabilities are unavailable or only partially available, and this is
contradistinguished from ‘risk’ which describes a situation in which we can attach precise
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probabilities to specific events even though we might be uncertain about their occurrence. This
distinction is important in the characterization and understanding of the problem of uncertainty
in climate science, especially with regards to the predictive power of climate models.
Several authors have come up with various typologies in their characterization of
uncertainty (Frigg et al. 2015b). The IPCC 2013 Assessment Report identifies three sources of
uncertainties. First, natural variability which is inherent in the earth system, and cannot be
mitigated by the advancement of knowledge or the addition of variables and data. Natural
climate variability is caused by various natural factors such as solar and lunar activities, the
oceanic-atmospheric interaction, etc. Models are designed and calibrated using past climatic
records, but as discussed earlier, the range of possible future climate scenarios is often wide and
may not be adequately captured by models. A second source of uncertainty comes from the
emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs). This has to do with the uncertainty in the possible
emission rates of GHGs and the trends of land use in the future. The rates of emission and future
trends of land use depend on various factors such as population, technology, socio-economic and
political choices that define the trajectory of the evolution of the human society. It is not easy to
estimate or predict this. Scientists only come up with different alternative scenarios and these
might not be exhaustive. A third source of uncertainty has to do with our imperfect knowledge of
the climatic response to the future emissions and land use trend by humans. This shows that
emission uncertainty and climate response uncertainty are closely linked together. Furthermore,
these types of uncertainties have serious consequences for climate modeling since different
models come up with different empirical estimates for the components that are difficult to
quantify precisely or currently not well understood. A fourth source of uncertainty is identifiable
and could be referred to as model uncertainty. This has to do with the challenges of “zooming in”
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on GCM’s to understand climate at the regional level as I briefly highlighted earlier. Also,
different models often employ different assumptions, methods and equations to arrive at some
empirical approximation when solving for these regional resolutions. It is possible that this kind
of uncertainty could be overcome with the development of better models in the future. In this
regard, Refsgaard et al. (2013) makes a distinction between epistemic uncertainty (resulting from
imperfect knowledge) and aleatory uncertainty (due to inherent variability, largely beyond our
control). Model uncertainty could be said to fall under epistemic uncertainty. The term
“aleatory” is derived from the Latin alea, meaning the rolling of dice. Thus, “an aleatoric
uncertainty is one that is presumed to be the intrinsic randomness of a phenomenon” (Der
Kiureghian and Ditlevsen (2009, 106). Aleatoric uncertainty in climate science is clearly related
to the issues of nonlinearity and chaotic dynamic. In this case, the problem of uncertain values or
parameters is a result of the fact that these values change every time the model is run because of
the nonlinear chaotic relationship between the variables. The problem is not with the model or
any shortcoming associated with the model; it is as a result of the inherent nature of the
dynamics of the system. Modeling cannot completely resolve the issue of aleatory uncertainty
because this type of uncertainty has nothing to do with the current state of knowledge in
modeling techniques.
It seems inescapable that scientists should strive to find a way of handling the issue of
uncertainty even though it is largely beyond their control. This becomes pertinent when science
is needed to inform policy-making. There are efforts at quantifying and reducing uncertainty in
climate science. Knutti (2008, 4650) sums this up by saying that “the question asked at the outset
of whether we should believe anything that our models predict about future climate is related to
how well we can quantify the uncertainty in model projections. To quantify uncertainty, one
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needs to decide whether a model is ‘credible’, ‘plausible’6, or consistent with observations (given
some known limitations of the model).” In general terms, the credibility or plausibility of a
model can be evaluated in terms of how well the models reproduced historical climate conditions
and short term forecasts. This backward-looking consideration seems to be the feasible option
due to the long period range of climate forecasts. This was the criteria employed by Brekke et al.
2008. It is the case that many models in use today are evaluated and considered credible and
plausible in simulating past and present climate, even though their projections of future climate
scenario do not converge.
So far, we see that the problem of the issue of uncertainty is at the heart of climate
modeling and climate science in general. It might be safe to assume that there is a considerable
awareness among climate scientists of the challenges these issues pose, and a better
understanding of the problem is certainly a way forward even though the causes of uncertainty
are sometimes aleatory. One method that has been employed to deal with the problem of
uncertainty in climate modeling is the use of ensemble models. The reason for ensemble models
is a result of the acknowledged uncertainties in individual models. Ensemble models seek to
produce and identify robust7 predictions, or provide the estimates of the uncertainty (in terms of
the range of scenarios projected by a set of individual models) about future climate scenario in
the bid to reduce the effects of the model uncertainties (Frigg et al. 2015b). This is done by
identifying the agreements across a collection of models, and then using that to quantify the
uncertainties and arrive at ‘robust’ predictions. For instance, when 17 models out of a collection
of 20 make an interesting predictive hypothesis that an increase in surface temperature of 0.3

7

By robustness in prediction or robust prediction I mean a predictive hypothesis that an ensemble or collection of
models agree on when simulating future climate scenarios (cf. Parker, 2015).
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Celsius will lead to the loss of 95 percent of the glacier ice sheets. This robust prediction gives us
an idea of the level of (un)certainty regarding a phenomenon of interest. Ensemble models come
with some significant problems as discussed by Parker (2011) and Winsberg (2012). Still, this is
not to say that they are not useful. In fact, ensembles are widely employed in climate science as
scientists seek to tackle the issue of uncertainty.
1.4 THE CONSENSUS ON CLIMATE SCIENCE
At this point, we are inclined to ask what implications all these have for climate
projections and climate science in general. From the above discussions, we have seen that the
issue of uncertainty is largely unavoidable. However, the nature of the field of climate science
and its subject matter seem to suggest that the discipline is on the right track, and our models are
getting better, but there is only so much information they can give us about a complex climate
system. Scientists are confident in the use of models because they are successfully employed in
the physical/hard sciences; models reasonably reproduce the distribution of the variables well
and continue improving. They also reproduce observed global trends and have been reliable in
simulating past climatic conditions. Furthermore, there is increased confidence in climate
modeling since multiple models tend to somewhat agree on large scale simulations, projections
from newer models are consistent with older models, etc. (Knutti 2008, 4656).
Despite the problem of uncertainty and the fact that the values of multiple model
predictions often do not converge, there seems to be an overwhelming consensus on
anthropogenic climate change among scientists. Oreskes (2004) highlights that the reports of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) clearly express the scientific consensus on
climate change. Indeed, IPCC (2013, 17) asserts that “[H]uman influence has been detected in
warming of the atmosphere and the ocean, in changes in the global water cycle, in reductions in
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snow and ice, in global mean sea level rise, and in changes in some climate extremes … It is
extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming
since the mid-20th century.” The term “extremely likely” expresses a probability of 95-100%8.
Oreskes also highlights that all major scientific bodies in the United States with relevant experts
agree with the IPCC on this; The National Academy of Sciences, The American Meteorological
Society, The American Geophysical Union and The American Association for the Advancement
of Science, among others. The normal processes of criticism and peer-review were adopted in the
drafting of the reports and positions of specific scientific bodies or communities, and this lends
credence to the claim that there is a consensus among scientists on the fact of anthropogenic
climate change. Were there legitimate dissenting views that were downplayed in the drafting of
these reports? Oreskes argues that an analysis of papers published in refereed journals between
1993 and 2003 indicate that this was not the case. “This analysis shows that scientists publishing
in the peer-reviewed literature agree with the IPCC, the National Academy of Sciences, and the
public statements of their professional societies. Politicians, economists, journalists, and others
may have the impression of confusion, disagreement, or discord among climate scientists, but
that impression is incorrect” (Oreskes 2004, 1686). A similar position was also expressed by
Cook et al. (2013) after a statistical analysis of the author self-ratings and abstract ratings of
thousands of papers published in peer-review journals between 1991 and 2011. They found out
that among the papers and authors who expressed a position on anthropogenic global warming,
the percentage of those that endorsed the consensus position was slightly more than 97 percent

8

The IPCC 2013 report gives a list of terms used to indicate the assessed likelihood of uncertainties. See Stocker et
al. (2013, 36).
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(Cook et al 2013, 1). Also, the percentage of papers rejecting the consensus view keeps shrinking
to a vanishingly small proportion over the years.9
That said, it is erroneous to simply conclude that the scientific consensus cannot be
wrong in this case. At least, the history of science warns us against adopting such a disposition
towards consensus views. Oreskes (2004, 1686), warning against this, points out that “[M]any
details about climate interactions are not well understood, and there are ample grounds for
continued research to provide a better basis for understanding climate dynamics.” Such is the
story of the development and growth of scientific knowledge; consensus does not suggest
dogmatism, and there are established norms within the scientific community to ensure that the
critical process is effectively deployed without degenerating into epistemic anarchism.

1.5 THE ISSUE OF DISSENT IN SCIENCE
As noted earlier, there is a wide consensus on the issue of climate change among
scientists. Despite the consensus, the critical process remains an integral aspect of scientific
practice: it is epistemically valuable because it has heuristic power. Scientific knowledge grows
as a result of the rigorous testing of hypotheses that are either confirmed as theories or rejected.
This rigorous process of testing sometimes involves the challenge posed by growing critical
alternative hypotheses. Also, well-established theories are not immune from this critical process
since there is the possibility that a novel idea can challenge standard theories. This keeps science
from relapsing into a dogmatic form of knowledge. I shall argue that even though climate science
is immersed in deep non-epistemic considerations and values which inform the production of

9

It is important to note that a significant percentage of the papers and authors were neutral on the issue. I think it
might be an oversimplification to view the neutrality of these papers as indicating the neutrality of the authors. In
fact, it is possible that the aim and structure of the papers does not require that the authors take a position.
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competing alternative hypotheses, this does not necessarily lead to bad science since nonepistemic factors may play a neutral, or even beneficial, role in scientific practice. I shall attempt
to characterize what constitutes epistemically detrimental dissent. Using that analysis, I shall
argue that we need to look beyond the sole intrusion of non-epistemic values in understanding
the problem of dissent in climate science. More precisely, a dissenting view may not be
dismissed on the sole basis of its being informed by non-epistemic considerations.
1.5.1 DISSENT IN CLIMATE SCIENCE
Scientists might hold dissenting views for a variety of reasons, sometimes depending on
their value orientation. These reasons might be epistemic such as the case of new evidence; or
they might be non-epistemic as in the case of a scientist who is motivated by desire for fame and
recognition or other personal interests and agenda. It is important to emphasize that the focus
should be on the ideas advanced in the dissenting views of the critical scientists rather than on
their agenda or interest. This is because having an agendum, motivation or subscribing to any
particular values does not necessarily make the ideas borne out of these bad. This is a point I
shall argue later.
There are usually controversies and disagreements on some specifics of a theory within
the scientific community. There might be disagreements on the data-theory fit interpretation, the
ranking of pieces of evidence, or the manner of experimentation that is expected to yield the best
plausible result. These do not necessarily constitute dissent since the disagreements are all geared
towards evaluating a hypothesis or theory. However, when there is an alternative view that
challenges the basis of the prevailing view of the scientific community such that it denies the
plausibility of the view, especially when such alternative view is held by a minority, then there is
dissent. We recall that Biddle and Leuschner (2015, 262) define dissent as “the act of objecting
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to a particular conclusion, especially one that is widely held.” Considering the cases of dissent in
climate science from the perspective of Biddle & Leuschner’s characterization, it is important to
highlight a significant point: the dissenting view is usually set against a widely accepted view.
However, this definition of dissent should not be taken to make the sole claim that
dissenting views usually deny the plausibility of only the conclusions, theories, or hypothesis. In
fact, dissenting views could latch onto disagreements on methods, evidence, and basic
assumptions during the process of theory formulation. This is especially the case in climate
science where the problem of uncertainty fuels some of the most problematic cases of dissent
and controversies. In the words of Harker (2015, 157), “[T]he mere fact that it is always possible
to query scientific ideas creates the opportunity for groups to repeatedly and strenuously draw
attention to the ways in which a complex set of ideas might be mistaken or incomplete, thereby
distracting us from whatever positive evidence and arguments are available. Uncertainty and
doubt are magnified and inflated.” This captures the prevalent dissenting position on
anthropogenic climate change, whereby dissenters argue that the findings of climate science are
too uncertain to inform meaningful action or policy.
Thus, when climate scientists arrive at different quantitative predictions of the rate of
global warming, or when climate models differ on their assumptions due to their focus on
different aspects of the system, then this does not count as dissent; disagreements in this case are
not dissent. Moreover, the disagreements notwithstanding, they seem to share one general
conclusion: that the climate is warming significantly as a result of human influence. On the other
hand, the case of scientists who are climate skeptics is a typical example of dissent, whether in
the form of romanticizing the challenge of uncertainties (and climate modeling as discussed
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earlier) or an outright denial of anthropogenic climate change despite the consensus within the
scientific community.

1.5.2 EPISTEMICALLY DETRIMENTAL DISSENT (EDD)
What constitutes epistemically detrimental dissent? Before addressing this question, I
want to highlight a crucial point: the problem of uncertainty does not entail that the standard of
epistemic merit in the evaluation of dissenting views should not be upheld. Scientific practice
involves continuous research and investigation to improve knowledge, and as highlighted in the
previous section, there is continued effort at coming up with ways to better manage the issue of
uncertainty within the scientific community. Thus, the commitment to coming up with an
adequate representation of the world still holds in climate science as much as it did in the
historical cases despite their differences. Consequently, every dissenting view is expected to lay
a solid claim to epistemic merit no matter what non-epistemic factors are involved.
In a recent paper, Le Bihan & Amadi (forthcoming) tried to lay out the proper causal
structure of the factors that lead to what we chose to call Epistemically Detrimental Dissent
(EDD). In that paper, we point out that criticism, controversy, and dissent are integral to the
advancement of science, especially once one recognizes that science is a collective enterprise.
However, we argue that some instances of dissent in the sciences clearly impede the collective
advancement of science; in other words, EDD. EDD has to do with the manufacturing of
controversies in some scientific fields. Several factors in the causal landscape of EDD were
identified which include the presence of severe non-epistemic risks, large financing, intrusion of
non-epistemic agendas/interests, skewed research and effective public dissemination of such
skewed research. The main claim in the paper is that the intrusion of non-epistemic agenda, and
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the presence of large financing and severe non-epistemic risks are only enabling causal factors
for EDD. We maintain that two stable difference-makers are core to the production of EDD: the
production of skewed science and the effective dissemination of that skewed research in the
public. This characterization is based on the distinction between contingent enabling factors and
stable difference makers. On the one hand, contingent enabling factors are those factors that
could well be “necessary” in the sense that the effect would not have occurred without that factor
playing a role in the causal process, but are also highly contingent on a specific environment, and
as such, they are unstable. By contrast, stable different makers are also possibly necessary, but
that is not what matters: what matters is that they hold under a wide range of environmental
conditions.
Applying the analysis of EDD to our discussion on climate science, we see that the
requirement of epistemic merit is a decisive factor in this analysis. Also, we see that a dissenting
view may not be dismissed on the sole basis of its being informed by non-epistemic
considerations. This claim is supported by a few reasons;
1.

It has been successfully argued that non-epistemic values do play legitimate roles in

science. The problem should be when this leads to skewed research. Skewed research, in other
words bad science, could be said to involve a practice that claims to be scientific without
adhering to the established methodology and rules of science. It is possible for there to be a case
of bad practice at any stage of the entire scientific process, from observation, hypothesis
construction, experimentation, theory formulation, etc. I shall discuss this further later in this
paper.
2.

Science is a collective enterprise with an established process of transformative criticism

and accepted ways of communicating research within the scientific community, and to policy20

makers and the public at large. There is a problem when these established critical process and
channels of communication are subverted by effectively engaging the public directly using the
mass media and sidestepping the peer-review process.
What follows in the rest of this work will be an expansion on these points. The main
claim is that there is a case of EDD when a scientist produces skewed research, side-steps the
critical and peer-review process and effectively disseminates this skewed science to the public;
thereby creating confusion within the public on an issue that enjoy wide consensus among
scientists.
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SECTION TWO
2.0
NON-EPISTEMIC VALUES IN SCIENCE AND THE PRODUCTION OF
SKEWED RESEARCH
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous section, we discussed the issues of uncertainty, parameterization and the
associated challenges in climate projection and how they play out in climate science. Different
scientists studying the same phenomenon might have different approaches for ‘resolving’ these
issues depending on the relative importance they attach to the various components or variables of
which parameters are difficult to constrain. Owing to the present configuration of society and
contemporary economic issues associated with the climate, climate science is clearly a policyrelevant science. The knowledge, epistemic benefits, and results of studies and research projects
in climate science are often tied to some non-epistemic considerations. Also, it may not seem farfetched that the approaches individual scientists or research groups adopt to tackle the challenges
in the science might depend on ‘why’ they are conducting the study, and this ‘why’ could be
fleshed out by some more or less non-epistemic consideration. It is no surprise then that climate
science is inextricably caught up with political and economic interests and issues. The findings
have enormous consequences on the economy, the business of corporations and the policy
direction of the society. It is tempting to accuse only climate skeptics as the only ones with
significant bias. The reality however is that both sides of the climate debate accuse each other of
bias because the views that define these positions could be easily identified with certain political
and economic ideologies. Jacques et al. (2008) reports that skeptics also accuse environmental
science as being corrupted by political agendas that has resulted in the unintentional or malicious
fabrication or gross exaggeration of the problem of climate change. It seems to be the widely
held view that what constitutes bad dissent in climate science has to do with the intrusion of non24

epistemic values. However, the thesis that the intrusion of non-epistemic values and
considerations is common in scientific practice is increasingly becoming a widely accepted
position. As such it is important to characterize the role of non-epistemic values in scientific
practice and in relation to the production of EDD.
In this section I start with a slightly historical approach to the discussion of the role of
values in science. I shall make the claim that, contrary to popular view on more established
sciences of physics, chemistry and biology, a look at the history of science (with particular
reference to three major cases) shows that non-epistemic factors and considerations played a
significant role in the success of the theories. I shall however concede that the role these factors
and considerations play in climate science seems to be of a different and deeper nature. This is
followed by a presentation of the discussion of the role of non-epistemic values in science by
some philosophers of science in the bid to show that non-epistemic factors have an important
place in scientific practice. This discussion is applied to the field of climate science and our
discussion of EDD; the claim will be made that there could be cases of intrusion of values which
lead to the production of skewed science. Such cases of intrusive values that lead to skewed
research in climate science are often illegitimate, but it is also conceivable that error or
incompetence could lead to the production of skewed science in a case of EDD.
2.2

NON-EPISTEMIC FACTORS IN THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE
There is a complex entanglement in the relationship between the epistemic and non-

epistemic factors in scientific practice. Whether we are talking about the foundational sciences or
the issues-based sciences, one thing seems clear from the history of science; these two classes of
factors are often present in some form or another and neither one of them is completely
suffocated in good science. However, I shall argue here that in the case of climate science, there
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seems to be a deeper (and somewhat inevitable) entanglement of the science with non-epistemic
considerations.
There is the tendency to assume that non-epistemic factors did not play a prominent role
in the revolutions recorded in the history of science, especially in the hard sciences. This view
subscribes to the value-free ideal of science. The value-free ideal of science holds that nonepistemic values, such as social and ethical considerations and factors, have no place in scientific
practice; only epistemic values (such as explanatory power, predictive accuracy, etc.) which are
thought to be those that are directly related to knowledge are allowed in science. However, a
look at some of the major historical episodes confronts us with the fact that non-epistemic factors
played very significant roles in the course of the events. Arguably, the kind of issues that are
associated with climate science today and the way contemporary society is configured is
remarkably different. But it would be an over-simplification of history to argue that the scientific
revolutions in history were mainly hinged on epistemic factors only. Galileo’s case involved
some politics and threatened the authority of the Church; his discoveries had a significant direct
consequence on the socio-political configuration of the society of his day. Duhem (1969, 107)
reports the words of Cardinal Bellarmine about the implications of Galileo’s insistence that the
foundations of astronomical theory conform to reality; “Not only may it irritate all philosophers
and scholastic theologians, it may also injure the faith and render the Holy Scripture false…”
This was a time when the authority of the Church held sway.
Also Chang (2010 and 2015) highlights that the Chemical Revolution was characterized
by the interplay of various factors, epistemic and social included, and it will be overly simplistic
to explain the “revolution” in terms of any one factor. For instance, he argues that Lavoisier and
his cohorts “did run an effective and well-coordinated campaign for their new chemistry,
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including the spreading of their new nomenclature and the controlling of institutional spaces
such as the Paris Académie and the new journal Annales de chimie.” But at the same time, the
success of his theory equally rested on the growing wave of the building-block ontology of
chemical composition which was gradually gaining traction at that time (Chang 2010, 69-70). In
the case of Darwin, Kitcher (2003, 11) points out that “part of the secret of Darwin’s quick
success surely lay in his political skill.” Also, it is important to emphasize that some of these
controversial epochs in the history of science generated significant socio-political concerns; both
Galileo’s and Darwin’s theories challenged the authority of the Church which was dominant at
that time and touched on the belief system of the people. Nevertheless, the non-epistemic factors
notwithstanding, the epistemic merit of the theories was based on their empirical success and
evidential superiority; and that was also crucial to their successful deposition of the status quo.
As such, both epistemic and non-epistemic factors played significant roles in these cases.
Now let us consider the issues-based sciences, especially climate science. There seems to
be something that remarkably distinguishes climate science from the past sciences. Perhaps, this
has something to do with the present configuration of society which is remarkably different from
the days of the revolutionary instances I discussed. We can identify a few distinguishing factors.
Firstly, the debates and discourses took place mainly among the community of scientists and in
laboratories. In climate science on the other hand, the main actors and stakeholders comprise a
much larger group of individuals beyond the class of scientists and political actors. Secondly, the
nature of the non-epistemic factors in climate science significantly differs from what was the
case with the historical revolutionary epochs. The presence of severe risks on the public and
industry financial interests seems to assume a central role in climate science. It might be the case
that some kind of relatively large financing was involved in the historical cases, but their
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economic implications are of a different nature from what is obtainable in the case of climate
science.
The implication of these is not far-fetched; despite the presence of non-epistemic factors
in both cases, climate science seems to have deeper socio-political and economic dimensions
than the past sciences (at least using the historical cases above as reference points). For those
historical instances, the effect of the consequences on the everyday economic life of the ordinary
citizen for the most part is minimal. For instance, heliocentricism or Darwinism touches on the
belief system of the regular individual but might not affect the source of their livelihood very
much. On the other hand, the nature of the issues and problems that climate science deals with,
and its huge implications for socio-economic and political concerns run deeper. Its findings have
enormous implications on the economic configuration of society as well as the everyday
economic life of the regular individual. Consequently, it has proven difficult so far to disentangle
the disagreements in the science from the socio-economic and political issues that its findings
give rise to, and the debates within the science could be said to be policy-based or policy-driven
in a sense.
Hence, it seems pertinent to concede that there is no escaping the presence of nonepistemic considerations in climate science.
2.3

CONTEMPORARY VIEWS ON THE ROLE OF NON-EPISTEMIC VALUES IN

SCIENCE
Various scholars have contributed to the discussion of the role of non-epistemic values in
scientific practice. If values are considered integral to science, then the questions arise of why
and how this is the case. There is the further question of characterizing what should be the
appropriate roles of these non-epistemic considerations in order to ensure the integrity and
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objectivity of the scientific enterprise. Here, I will present the attempts of various philosophers of
science at addressing these questions.
2.3.1 THE INESCAPABLE ROLE FOR VALUES IN POLICY-RELEVANT
RESEARCH: KEVIN ELLIOTT
Kevin Elliott argues that contextual (non-epistemic) values are part and parcel of
scientific practice. Elliott (2011a, 59) defines societal values as “qualities or states of affairs that
societies or social groups hold to be good or desirable. Typical examples include fairness,
justice, diversity, efficiency, liberty, stability, privacy, and community.” Elliott (2011a) argues
that societal values have a significant role in policy-relevant research. This argument is based on
three major principles, and scientists have the ethical responsibility to appeal to societal values in
their response when these principles apply to any cases they are working on (Elliot 2011a, 55):
The ethics principle – Scientists are ethically obliged to consider the major societal consequences
of their work, and as such take reasonable steps to mitigate harmful effects that might arise.
The uncertainty principle – It is often the case that the scientific information in policy-relevant
research topics is uncertain and incomplete, and the scientists involved in such research have to
take a decision on what should count as standard proof before drawing conclusions.
The no-passing-the-buck principle – It is frequently impracticable and socially harmful for
scientists to respond to uncertainty by withholding their judgment or providing uninterpreted
data to policy makers.
These principles, according to Elliot, come in handy in justifying two prominent
strategies for challenging the value-free ideal viz: the gap argument and the error argument.
Proponents of the value-free ideal assert that a narrow formulation could effectively justify the
exclusion of societal values in research. One narrow interpretation of the value-free ideal would
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be to argue that contextual values should be excluded from very specific aspects of scientific
reasoning. For instance, when a scientist is faced with a particular theory or hypothesis and a
particular body of evidence, there is no legitimate role for societal values in evaluating the
evidential support for the theory/hypothesis.
The “gap” argument responds to this claim by highlighting that there is always a logical
gap and underdetermination between theory and evidence. It is unavoidably the case that this gap
is usually “filled” by such considerations as societal values. The “error” argument, on the other
hand, emphasizes that researchers, when drawing conclusions, always run the risk of either
accepting a claim that turns out to be false (a false positive or Type I error) or rejecting a claim
that turns out to be true (a false negative or Type II error). Elliot (2011a, 66-70) argues that the
three principles (ethical, uncertainty and no-passing-the-buck) lend credence and justification to
the claims of these arguments despite the various possible objections that might be raised against
them.
In chapter 2 of Is a Little Pollution Good for You? Elliott, using the hormesis research as
a case study, adumbrates and discusses what he referred to as “categories of judgments or
methodological decisions that impinge on scientific research” (Elliot 2011a, 28). These include
judgments involving (1) the choice of research projects and design of studies; (2) developing
scientific language; (3) evaluating studies; (4) applying research. He maintains that the case
could be made for the legitimate role of societal values in policy-relevant research that involves
these categories of judgments, although it is more obvious in some than in others.
The obvious or easy cases are the decisions on (1) and (4). That contextual values play a
legitimate role in the choice and design of studies seems to be an uncontroversial claim
according to Elliot. And this claim still holds even if a (controversial) distinction is made
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between “basic” and “applied” science. In terms of “applied” science (e.g. policy-relevant
research such as geoengineering), it is intuitive that the consideration of such societal
considerations such as what is needed usually plays some role in the choice of what studies to
pursue. Even for a study that is considered as basic research, societal values usually play some
role in the choice of continuing with the study instead of some other endeavors.
Also it seems uncontroversial that societal values play a legitimate role in the decisions
on applying research (4). Societal values come into play when deciding whether new researchdriven regulatory policies are justified and also in determining how to address the combined
benefits and harms that result from the new policies. Furthermore, societal values play a clear
and important role in deciding what ethical approach (deontological or utilitarian) to adopt in
addressing these benefits and harms. This could be seen in cases that involve social justice issues
such as when there is a disadvantaged group or population. Elliot (2011a, 72) argues that such
societal considerations play a clear and uncontroversial role in the application of scientific
knowledge to public policy when such issues are involved.
Regarding categories (2) and (3), Elliot (2011a) presents a detailed argument for the
legitimate role of societal values using the three principles used to justify the gap argument
(ethical, uncertainty, and no-passing-the-buck principles). In the categories of judgment that
deals with the development of scientific language (2), scientists have the ethical responsibility to
consider the major impacts of their conclusions on society; they have the responsibility to choose
their descriptions or how to frame the concepts in their studies from a range of options. Also, this
choice is inevitable even if they do not have decisive reasons to accept one terminology rather
than another.
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In a similar vein, as regards decisions on the evaluation of studies (3), scientists have the
ethical responsibility to consider societal factors when interpreting and evaluating evidence. This
is especially the case in policy-relevant research because scientists are aware of the societal
ramifications of their work. Also, scientists are often faced with uncertainty because judgments
that deal with the evaluation and interpretation of evidence are usually underdetermined by
epistemic values and they have the responsibility to make practical decisions despite their
epistemic uncertainty (Elliot 2011a, 77).
According to Elliott, societal values are relevant to practical judgments about which
hypothesis to accept as a basis for action. “Once societal values influence the collection,
analysis, and interpretation of data, scientists can find it difficult to keep their epistemic and
practical judgments distinct in practice” (2011a, 80). As such non-epistemic values inescapably
play crucial roles in scientific research.
2.3.2 THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT ROLES FOR NON-EPISTEMIC VALUES IN
SCIENCE: HEATHER DOUGLAS
Douglas (2009) also argues along the lines that social and ethical values are part of an
ideal for scientific reasoning. The basis of this claim is similar to Elliott’s principles viz:
scientists need these values to make judgments about the potential social and ethical
consequences of error their work, the importance of those consequences and set the burdens of
proof accordingly. However, she has a normative dimension to the discussion. Douglas warns
that there must be important limits placed on the role these values play in science. “To find these
limits, it is time to explore and map the territory of values in science. This will allow me to
articulate a new ideal for values in science, a revised understanding of how values should play a
role in science and of what the structure of values in science should be” (Douglas 2009, 87). This
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is in reaction against the value-free ideal of science and its claim that non-epistemic values, such
as social and ethical considerations and factors, have no place in scientific practice.
Hence, Douglas sets out to argue that values can play direct and indirect roles in science.
She maintains that values can play an indirect role at every stage of the scientific process, but the
direct role is acceptable only for certain kinds of decisions in science. In the direct role, “values
determine our decisions in and of themselves, acting as stand-alone reasons to motivate our
choices. They do this by placing value on some intended option or outcome, whether it is to
valorize the choice or condemn it” (Douglas 2009, 96). An example would be if I chose to take
green tea often because I value the health benefits of it’s being a good antioxidant. The direct
role is needed when scientists make a decision on which research projects to carry out, when
allocating funds for research, and at the stage of deciding which methodology to pursue after
choosing a research project (2009, 98-99). A direct role is in play when a scientist chooses a
particular subject of interest for his research; say for instance, a climate scientist chooses to study
carbon sequestration because she hopes to understand how much a reforestation project would be
beneficial in the quest to reduce the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
There could be cases of conflicting values in a research project. Douglas gives the
example of testing pesticides on a selected human population in a controlled situation in view of
understanding the effects of the chemical composition of the pesticide on humans. There is a
conflict between the epistemic advantages of such tests and the social/ethical concerns involved.
In such cases, the social and ethical values trump the cognitive advantages of the test, argues
Douglas (2009, 100).
It is usually problematic when values are allowed to play a direct role during the later
stages of research (Douglas, 2009, 102). In such cases, a scientist could reject data or evidence,
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or even interpret it to fit her perspective merely on the basis of non-epistemic consideration. An
example would be rejecting the theory of evolution because of Christian doctrine.
In an indirect role, “values instead serve to assess the sufficiency of evidence for our
choices. Values here evaluate whether we think the uncertainties concerning our choices are
acceptable, by assessing the consequences of error rather than by assessing the choices
themselves” (Douglas et al. forthcoming, 7). Douglas et al. demonstrate this with an example; if
Jane does not accept the claim that she needs yearly mammograms between the ages of 40 and
50 because she does not consider the currently available evidence strong enough to support the
claim, especially given the known risk of cancer generated by the radiation needed to do the
mammogram and the value she places on avoiding that risk; that is an indirect role for values in
her judgment. Jane would re-evaluate and change her mind accordingly if the evidence becomes
stronger. “The value serves only to assess the acceptability of uncertainty, staying in the indirect
role” (forthcoming, 7). In this case, a direct role for values would be a total rejection of
mammograms no matter the amount of evidence showing the benefits, simply because she avoids
x-rays at all costs. On the basis of this distinction, Douglas et al. argue that, in scientific practice,
the indirect role is needed and acceptable at every stage considering that science is a “valuesaturated process.” The direct role, on the other hand, should be excluded at certain stages.
Douglas, by making a distinction between the direct and indirect roles for values, makes a
case for a new normative ideal that seeks to replace the value-free ideal while checkmating the
unacceptable intrusion of non-epistemic factors in science. There is the question of how effective
this distinction for evaluating research. I shall address that issue later.
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2.3.3 LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE VALUES IN CLIMATE SCIENCE:
KRISTEN INTEMANN
Kristen Intemann (2015) also brings in a normative bent to the discussion on the role of values.
However, instead of evaluating non-epistemic values on the basis of the nature of the role (for
instance Douglas’s direct via indirect) they play in the scientist’s research, Intemann advocates
the aims approach in the discussion of the place of non-epistemic values in science. The aims
approach maintains that a distinction can be made between legitimate and illegitimate values on
the basis of whether or not they promote democratically endorsed epistemological and social
aims of research. Scientists are obliged to make value judgments in their choice of
methodological and conceptual frameworks, models and tools, as well as strategies for dealing
with uncertainties. And these choices must be based on the aims of the research context which
“must be justified by democratic mechanisms that secure the representative participation of
stakeholders likely to be affected by the research” (Intemann 2015, 219). Intemann further points
out that the legitimacy of value judgments on this approach is a matter of degree, depending on
how much they could be said to promote the aims of research, and the extent to which they
reflect democratically held values.
Applying the aims approach to climate modeling, Intemann identifies various ways in
which it is legitimate for scientists to make value judgments and appeal to the ethical and social
aims of the particular research context in making modeling decisions. These include:
Judgments about model adequacy
General Circulation Models (GCMs) provide information and make useful predictions on
changes in the global average temperature. These projections may not be very helpful for
regional adaptive measures. Regional Climate Models (RCMs) come in handy in such cases, and
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depending on the aims of the research, individual scientists could legitimately make value
judgments on what model features would be adequate in their model design. The adequacy of the
model in this case hinges on its ability to serve its purposes as long as they reflect the
democratically held values or aims for the region in designing the model. These social and
ethical values or aims could range from discounting and duration mapping (sustainability
concerns) to economic concerns (food production, forced migration resulting from floods, etc.).
For instance, if the concern is how to adapt to worst-case scenarios, then it seems legitimate to
choose models that capture extreme weather events.
Decisions about epistemic trade-offs
According to Intemann (2015), value judgments could also play a legitimate role when
scientists are faced with the task of adjudicating between epistemic or cognitive values in view
of promoting particular social and policy aims of research. Precisely in the practice of model
tuning or parameterization (when “zooming in” on GCMs), scientists adjust model parameters to
match observed variables. “Improving the model in certain respects often means that it is less
accurate in other respects” (Intemann 2015, 221). In the aims approach, the justification for such
epistemic trade-offs lies in the social and/or policy aims of the research. For instance, models
that are tuned to provide a better representation of the tropical precipitation between land and
ocean in Maritime Southeast Asia may not perform well in representing tropical intraseasonal
variability (Mauritsen et al. 2013).
Intemann also identified and discussed other ways in which value judgments could play
legitimate roles in climate modeling. These include: assessing causation, employing normative
concepts, dealing with uncertainties, selecting evidential categories, and interpreting data
(Intemann 2015, 221-228).
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Intemann concedes that much work still needs to be done in developing the aims
approach, especially in terms of what constitute “democratically endorsed” research aims.
However, she identified and addressed some objections. Firstly, an objection might be that the
aims approach might not be able to exclude paradigm cases of illegitimate values; for example a
group could decide to promote the aim of stalling regulatory policy. Intemann (2015, 227)
responds by highlighting that “value judgments will be illegitimate insofar as they are not
relevant to promoting democratically endorsed aims of the research.” Thus, aims are not hinged
on the whims and caprices of just any group, but are developed by a democratic mechanism that
involves all relevant stakeholders. A second objection could be that the aims approach is
consistent with the value-free ideal since the social and ethical value judgments that constitute
the aims of the research are made by the stakeholders, not the scientists. Individual scientists
merely engage in practical reasoning about what means will achieve or promote those aims.
Intemann (2015, 227) responds by arguing that scientists, even with a means/ends reasoning,
engage in value judgments since they make evaluations on which means best serves stakeholder
interests from a range of available options.
A final objection that Intemann identified focused on is the challenge of coming up with
a “democratic” machinery for developing the aims of research. The objection highlights the
challenging issues of identifying who constitutes a stakeholder and how best to represent a
stakeholder group and, even if this were possible, how to get all stakeholders to work together to
come up with a consensus on what the aims of a particular research context should be, etc.
Intemann responds by arguing that it is a mistake to think that the aims approach requires a twostep process: democratically setting research aims and scientific research to achieve those aims.
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“Rather, both climate science and stakeholder engagements can proceed (as they do now) as a
process of interactive feedback loops” (Intemann 2015, 228).

The merit of these views cannot be over-stated. One theme that runs through all three
views is that non-epistemic values permeate every step of the scientific process in some way.
However, the different approaches in the normative ideals adumbrated by Douglas and Intemann
indicate the complex nature of evaluating how values should (not) be incorporated in scientific
practice. Douglas (2009) and Elliott (2011a) outline the arguments and bases for the claim that
non-epistemic values play an integral role in science, the moral obligation to consider the
consequences of error being one of the major bases of the claim. For Douglas’s account, its
success as an ideal for scientific practice lies in the effective distinction between cases of a direct
role and indirect role for values. This distinction may not always be an easy one to make. Elliott
(2011b) points out that one way to make sense of this distinction would be on the basis of the
motives of scientists rather than their actions. The problem with this is that it is not always the
case that humans have a clear grasp of their motivations. Elliott (2011b, 321) demonstrates this
with an example, “suppose that a regulatory scientist who hates the chemical industry chooses to
use a particular dose-response model that tends to be highly protective of public health (i.e., it
tends to overestimate rather than underestimate the harmfulness of toxic chemicals). It seems
unlikely that this scientist would be able to reliably distinguish whether he was choosing that
particular model in order to avoid falsely exonerating toxic chemicals (an indirect role for
values) or in order to cause financial trouble for the industry (a direct role for values).” Now
imagine if there is a case whereby different scientists on the same research team have different
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motives even though they use the same methodology. As such, it might not be a simple task to
evaluate a research project based on the nature of the role non-epistemic values played.
For the aims approach, despite Intemann’s acknowledgement that some work needs to be
done in terms of what the democratic mechanism should be, some other issues seem to demand
attention. Precisely, even if it seems feasible that an effective democratic mechanism could be
put in place and work in a feedback loop with scientific research, there seems to be no objective
way to regulate the aims that are set for research or what should objectively count as an aim
worth pursuing or not. Let us demonstrate this with an imperfect example; right from the years
after the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, leaders of some of the most powerful nations including the United
States, Australia, and the United Kingdom latched onto the prospect of the Carbon Capture and
Storage (CCS) technology and funded studies to realize the supposed potentials. CCS
technology, it is expected, would be able to capture up to 90 percent of the CO2 emissions from
fossil fuel-powered industrial processes and electricity generation, thereby drastically reducing
the amount of CO2 released into the atmosphere. Governments touted this supposedly promising
technology and economists lauded it as the way to go. But the problem is that “from the outset
impartial experts argued that the promise of CCS was exaggerated” (Hamilton 2010, 9). For our
purposes here, I shall assume that the backing of the government provides a basis for the claim of
“democratic endorsement” in a sense; the government is the trustee of the people, and this case
did not really incite significant direct public involvement in the issue. This is a typical case of
economic considerations with exaggerated promises conflicting with environmental
considerations. From Intemann’s analysis, it could be argued that if the optimistic results of the
pro-CCS studies are based on the aims of the studies, then they are justified. This gives us an
idea of how problematic the aims approach could be since there is no guarantee that the
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democratically endorsed aims of research would be worth pursuing and/or how to make such
adjudication.
From the foregoing, we can make the distinction between the normative approaches of
Douglas (2009) and Intemann (2015). For Douglas, the legitimacy of non-epistemic values in
scientific practice depends on how these values intrude. Whereas for Intemann, legitimacy
depends on which kinds of values are intruding. The upshot of the problems we raised for these
normative approaches is that there could be cases where it is slightly challenging to evaluate
good or bad science solely on the basis of the non-epistemic factors involved. However, we do
not need to first determine the nature and role of any non-epistemic factors involved in
adjudicating the project to be good science or skewed research. Neither do we need to prove that
a scientist willingly skewed his/her research (with ill intentions) in order to decide for a case of
skewed science. Furthermore, the non-epistemic factors involved may not have necessarily
played a problematic role, at least when considered from Douglas’s or Intemann’s accounts. The
crucial fact is that the research does not fulfill the accepted standards of good science. The
implication of this to our discussion of EDD is that the production of skewed science is the stable
factor, and its characterization does not have to depend on the evaluation of the roles of the nonepistemic factors involved; these factors are contingent. Nevertheless, owing to the way current
society is configured and the centrality of the issues that climate science deals with in the socioeconomic and political spheres, cases of skewed science in climate science are often anchored on
an unwholesome role for non-epistemic values.
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2.4

SKEWED SCIENCE IN THE PRODUCTION OF EDD IN CLIMATE SCIENCE
From the foregoing discussion, we could see that non-epistemic values do play legitimate

roles in science in general, and especially in policy-relevant research. There is a sense in which
non-epistemic factors are inevitable but also benign in climate science as a policy-relevant
science. Also, Winsberg’s (2012, 124) highlights the inevitability of value judgments in climate
modeling. “When a climate modeler is confronted with a choice between two ways of solving a
modeling problem, she may be aware that each choice strikes a different balance of inductive
risks with respect to a problem that concerns her at the time…when a modeler is confronted with
a methodological choice, she will have to decide which metric of success to use when evaluating
the likely success of the various possibilities. And it is hard to see how choosing a metric of
success will not reflect a social or ethical value judgment, or possibly even a response to a
political pressure, about which prediction task is more ‘important’ (in a not purely epistemic
sense).” This is in line with the views of Douglas (2009), Elliott (2011) and Intemann (2015) as
discussed above. This sense of inevitability of the intrusion of non-epistemic factors makes it
implausible to evaluate a dissenting view mainly on the basis of the value-inclinations since that
would lead to the difficulty of trying to adjudicate between values.
This is not a denial of the claim that there are identifiable acceptable and unacceptable
roles for values. Rather, the merit of a dissenting theory or view lies in its claim to provide a
more adequate explanation of the world than the competing theories. We do not necessarily need
to ascertain the merit or otherwise of a dissenting theory on the basis of influence of nonepistemic values. That is why I argue, on the basis of our characterization of EDD, that the major
factors are the production of skewed research and the bypassing of the established channels of
scientific communication to effectively feed the public with their “research.”
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At this point, it might be useful to characterize how skewed science as a stable difference
maker in the production of EDD plays out in climate science. But before that, it is important to
note that applying the EDD analysis to the historical instances discussed earlier also shows that
they were not cases of EDD because skewed research and effective public dissemination were
not the decisive factors (the effective campaigns and political skills of Darwin and Lavoisier
would not constitute effective public dissemination since they mainly engaged their peers, and
more importantly, no skewed research had been done).
Characterizing what constitutes skewed or bad science is no easy task. I will be reluctant
to attempt coming up with any list of necessary and sufficient conditions that determine what
counts as good or bad science. Indeed, philosophy of science over the years have concerned itself
with understanding what should count as (good) science and why we should have confidence in
scientific theories and knowledge. It is the case that philosophers of science since the 20th
century had advanced various and quite different ideas of what qualifies as a good scientific
theory. That being said, it is not bogus to make the claim that good science can be distinguished
from bad or skewed research.
In order to attempt a discussion of what constitutes bad science, it seems plausible to
have a sense of what scientific inquiry is in general. Longino (1991, 17) thinks of scientific
inquiry as a social activity and should not be merely reduced to the products of inquiry. From
this, a good understanding of science would take at least two important aspects into
consideration within a social context: practices (methodology) and products or goals (knowledge,
theory, predictions, control, etc.). The importance of highlighting the social nature of scientific
inquiry cannot be over-emphasized since it has enormous bearing on the quest for the objectivity
of science; hence the methodology and goals of science are not merely arbitrary or subjective.
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In terms of methodology, science as a communal enterprise subscribes to certain rules,
criteria or standards which govern the way science seeks to achieve its goals. Certain
characteristics such as objectivity, reproducibility, or past success are intrinsic to the justification
of a scientific methodology (Anderson & Hepburn, 2016). Ideally, these standards apply at, and
guide every step of scientific inquiry – from collection/interpretation of data and
experimentation, through the formulation of hypothesis and theories. These steps are not immune
from the intrusion of non-epistemic values and background assumptions. Longino (1990, 86)
identified ways in which values can enter a given research program and shape knowledge being
produced therein: practices, questions, data, specific assumptions and global assumptions The
essential transformative critical process integral to science as a communal enterprise serves the
purpose of enforcing the standards and checkmating the unacceptable intrusion of values and
background assumptions. As such, good science could be said to be scientific inquiry or research
whose methodology and products subscribe to the standards.
The methodology of scientific inquiry is expected to yield the desired aims and products
of science (knowledge, control, prediction, etc.). We could say that the legitimacy of any of the
goals of inquiry lies in its being achieved through the application of the established standards and
criteria of scientific inquiry. For instance, astrology is considered as pseudoscience since it does
not subscribe to these standards, even though it claims to offer explanation and predictions using
the positioning of the stars and planets.
A very important requirement for the legitimacy of scientific aims and methodology is
that they successfully pass through the communal critical process that strives to ensure
objectivity. As such, individual scientists follow established standards and defer authority to the
entire community. Kitcher (1992) talks about the idea of consensus practice within the scientific
43

community; “it is constituted by a language; an (impersonal) assessment of significant questions;
a set of accepted statements with a (partial) justificatory structure; a set of explanatory schemata;
a set of paradigms of authority and criteria for identifying authorities; a set of exemplary
statements, observations, and instruments and justificatory criteria; and, finally, a set of
methodological exemplars and methodological principles” (Kitcher 1992, 87). When an
individual scientist or a group of scientists come up with a novel idea or claim, that claim is
critically considered by the community using their shared standards, accepted as valid
knowledge, acknowledged as potentially useful and needing further research, or rejected if it
fails to satisfy the criteria of scientific inquiry. Without this mechanism, it could be difficult for
science to hold onto its claim as a systematized body of knowledge since that could lead to a
situation whereby anything goes – literally – in that case. As such, deferring authority to the
community does not entail dogmatism. Rather, it ensures that every claim to knowledge meets
the established standards that governs scientific practice. When an idea is rejected by the
community, it does not mean that it is discarded completely. It could still be considered as
promising or accepted if new evidence emerges in its favor. The reproducibility of research
means that other scientists could still work on the idea.
From the discussion above, we can identify what could count as skewed research. Firstly,
there is skewed research when the research fails to meet the established standards and criteria
that govern scientific inquiry, or when a purported scientific explanation, theory, prediction or
knowledge did not yield from the scientific method. For instance, when a scientist plays down
the role of GHG’s or overlooks the importance of melting glaciers when making climate
projections. Another example would be when an astrologer makes horoscope predictions that
appear to be true. Secondly, there is skewed research when the inquiry advances results that are
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informed by assumptions that have been considered and rejected by the community, informed by
the desire to advance an already held assumption, and challenges the authority of the scientific
community in an unwholesome manner. In other words, the scientist(s) go rogue in a bid to
advance other interests. As I mentioned earlier, this would not be the case if the scientist(s) defer
to the authority of community while striving to improve on their idea if they truly believe it has a
legitimate claim to knowledge.
Climate scientists have sometimes been accused of groupthink. “Groupthink” is a concept
introduced by Irvin Janis to denote the psychological tendency of members of a group towards
conformity, thereby suppressing dissent. The main principle of groupthink, according to Janis
(1971, 85) is: “The more amiability and esprit de corps there is among the members of a policymaking ingroup, the greater the danger that independent critical thinking will be replaced by
groupthink, which is likely to result in irrational and dehumanizing actions directed against
outgroups.” Scientists whose research and studies validate the claims of anthropogenic climate
change have been accused of groupthink. How true is this claim?
In order to address that question, it is useful to highlight two important terms that Janis
used: “amiability” and “esprit de corps.” These terms suggest a strong social cohesion among the
members of the group. This is more evident when consider the symptoms of groupthink as
adumbrated by Janis (1971): illusion of invulnerability and unanimity, collectively constructing
rationalizations so as to brush off negative feedback, unquestioned belief in the morality of the
group, apply direct pressure to any member that expresses any doubts, stereotyped view of
“enemy” groups, etc. (Janis, 1971).
Social cohesion is often anchored on shared values, commitments and intentions and “the
sorts of groups identified by social psychologists as exhibiting a high level of social cohesion are
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precisely groups that engage in shared cooperative activity – committees, task groups, sales
teams, and scientific research teams” (Tollefsen 2006, 42). This sounds like a damning verdict
against climate scientists as a result of the value-ladenness of the results of their studies.
However, it would be an extremely difficult claim to make that the scientific community is a
highly socially cohesive group. It is possible that various research groups working on climate
science have strong social cohesion within the groups; however, it would be sheer
oversimplification to make the claim that such social cohesion translates and extends to the entire
community of scientists. The claim that climate scientists exhibit the qualities of groupthink
seems to overlook the fact that the consensus on anthropogenic climate change is based on
numerous studies conducted by scientists on various different research groups. Moreover, the
various research groups often compete among themselves; for instance, funding opportunities are
limited and research teams have to compete for the available opportunities. In such cases, it is
difficult to make the claim that the various research groups and teams share the kind of social
cohesion that characterizes groupthink.
Thus, competition is an important aspect of scientific practice. Of course there are shared
values and commitments that the entire scientific community subscribes to – the accepted
standards of scientific practice. However, it is this commitment to the shared standards and
methodology that ensures that the critical process is sustained within and across research groups
and leaves room for competing differing views (including dissent). Well-supported outstanding
claims often generate significant interest within the scientific community. For instance, in the
case of climate science, if a scientist or group of scientists could find a plausible scientific way to
deny the claim of anthropogenic climate change, then that would be an important contribution
that could have great benefits such as fame and great funding opportunities. As such, there is
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enough incentive that encourages intellectual competition within the scientific community. This
makes the groupthink claim in climate science implausible.

In climate science, various phases of research are prone to what we might refer to as bad
scientific practice. For instance, there seems to be a large consensus among scientists on the data
from paleoclimatology, especially the records of the climate from the mid-19th century when
scientists started recording climate data. However, how to interpret these data and how much
should be attributed to anthropogenic influences are subjects of controversies. As such, skewed
science in climate science could manifest in the form of a biased interpretation of climate data.
Such unwholesome interpretation could stem from a number of reasons ranging from sheer
incompetence to the quest to justify a presupposed conclusion.
The hockey stick controversy is an instance of this whereby interest groups such as the
fossil fuel industry funds research to question the reconstruction of the temperature record of the
past millennium. Several scientific reconstructions of the temperature record for the past
millennium (Bradley & Jones, 1993; Mann, Bradley & Hughes, 1998) have shown an unmatched
sharp rise in the record of the past 150 years following a long-term decline for the previous
centuries. A graphical representation of this gave rise to the “hockey stick graph;” the outline
looks like a hockey stick. There have been some authors (Soon & Ballunas 1998; Holland 2007)
disputing the claim of the hockey stick graph. Connor (2013) reports that industry-funded groups
and lobbyists have been disputing the data and methods used in this reconstruction. The aim was
to argue that the temperature of the planet has not increased as the hockey stick graph shows, and
even if there was significant warming, it was not as a result of the increased emission of CO2
from the use of fossil fuels; hence the hockey stick controversy. However, the US National
47

Academy of Sciences (NAS) has come out to back the findings of Mann (1998), expressing that
they (members of the NAS) “roughly agree with the substance of their work.”10
The practice of climate modeling is also another area that could prove to be prone to
skewed research. There are several General Circulation Models that are used in climate
projection. As we saw in section one, there are no standard measurements for some of the data
that are fed into these models. As such, scientists employ parameterization to account for some
of these variables in their modeling of projected future climate scenarios. What informs a
scientist’s assumptions and choice of parameters and values in this case could be prone to error.
And as in the case of data interpretation, incompetence or bias are potential decisive factors for
such cases of error or bad science. For instance, Oreskes and Conway (2010, 186) reports that
the Marshall institute released a report authored by Robert Jastrow, Russell Seitz, and Bill
Nierenberg blaming the increase in global temperatures on the activities of the sun. They cherrypicked data from a study that claimed the causes for the trend in global temperatures from 1880
were CO2, volcanoes and the increased solar activity, with emphasis on the effects of the
increased emission of CO2. However, the Marshall institute, motivated by the goal of attacking
climate science and “environmental alarmists,” released this report by Jastrow, Seitz and
Nieremberg which effectively excised CO2 and argued that the increased activities of the sun was
the major cause of global warming. This is a typical case of bias being the decisive factor in
scientific research.
These cases of skewed science were clearly motivated by an unwholesome role of nonepistemic factors. But what stands out is that there was skewed research produced. As I tried to
10
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highlight earlier, cases of skewed research might be as a result of a role for values in situations
that we might not easily adjudicate their legitimacy or illegitimacy. Thus, the intrusion of nonepistemic values might lead to skewed research, and indeed this is often the case in climate
science, however this must not be the case. Applying this analysis to our characterization of
EDD, the intrusion of non-epistemic values is only enabling factors of EDD. A stable difference
maker is the production of skewed research.
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SECTION THREE
3.1 SCIENCE IS A COLLECTIVE ENTERPRISE WITH ESTABLISHED CHANNELS
OF COMMUNICATION
It is safe to assume that bad science or skewed research on its own does not constitute
what we have characterized as EDD. The rationale behind this claim is that science as a
communal endeavor could identify and address skewed research and bad practices (either
resulting from incompetence or bias) with an effective peer review mechanism. There is a case of
EDD when bad scientific practice or skewed research manages to rig the system by engaging the
public directly using an effective medium.
Conceding that values are integral to scientific practice does not entail that anything goes
in the sciences; far from it. Longino argues that the social character of science ensures the
objectivity of scientific investigations. This social character does not mean an aggregation of
individual efforts, rather “scientific knowledge is…produced through a process of critical
emendation and modification of those individual products by the rest of the scientific
community” (Longino 1990, 68). Individual ideas and hypotheses (subject to value-ladenness)
are passed through the crucible of critical analysis by the entire scientific community. Kitcher
(1993, 70) buttresses this point: “If no single scientific mind can store all the propositions (say)
that are relevant to the further advancement of a field, then the differences among scientists are
not accidental but essential to continued growth: the development of the field would be stunted if
uniformity were imposed.” This highlights the social nature of the process of knowledge
production in science. According to Longino, publicity is essential due to the social character of
hypothesis acceptance. Hence, theoretical assertions, hypotheses, background assumptions are
public in terms of being generally available; and the states of affairs to which theoretical
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explanations are pegged are public in the sense of being intersubjectively ascertainable. This
makes criticism possible in a way different from mystical experiences or emotional expressions.
Thus, scientific claims are criticized, reviewed, evaluated in relation to competing claims
in the bid to rid them of all crude subjective elements. Longino outlines two kinds of criticism:
Evidential criticism: this questions the degree to which a given hypothesis is supported
by the evidence adduced for it, also questions the accuracy, extent, and conditions of
performance of the experiments and observations.
Conceptual criticism: Longino distinguishes three kinds viz; (a) questions the conceptual
soundness of a hypothesis; (b) questions the consistency of a hypothesis with accepted theory;
(c) questions the relevance of evidence presented in support of a hypothesis (Longino 1990, 72).
She maintains that (c), criticism that questions the relevance of evidence presented in
support of a hypothesis, is crucial for the problem of objectivity since it questions the
background assumptions in light of which states of affairs become evidence. This is relevant to
our interest in the role of values. “As long as background beliefs can be articulated and subjected
to criticism from the scientific community, they can be defended, modified, or abandoned in
response to such criticism” (Longino, 1990, 72). Background beliefs and assumptions affect the
choice of evidence, the interpretation of data and the weight given to successful tests and
experiments. It is important that these assumptions be subjected to the critical process among
other competing assumptions and beliefs by the entire scientific community. “Criticism is
thereby transformative” since it permits the transformation of background assumptions and
beliefs. Subjecting assumptions, beliefs and value judgments to this critical process validates
them. Intemann (2001) points out that scientists make value judgments on whose testimony is
taken to be reliable. These evaluative judgments and assumptions influence which theories,
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hypotheses or data they decide to pursue, and the choice of what will count as evidence for or
against a theory. It is important to note that the justification or otherwise of these value
judgments is what helps to support evidence for a theory or otherwise. “(I)f we recognize a case
where scientists have implicitly relied on a value judgment in their theorizing, we cannot
immediately infer that it is a case of bad science. Rather, we must seek to determine whether the
judgment was in fact relevant and, if so, whether it is justified.” (Intemann 2001, S517) These
value judgments are not taken at face value, they pass through the crucible of the rigorous critical
process of the scientific community.
Thus the emergence of dissenting views is an integral part of science, and Intemann tries
to characterize what constitutes reasonable dissent in scientific practice as we saw in the previous
sub-section. Addressing how the scientific community should function, she writes; “Although it
will also be important to allow room for dissent within scientific communities (again because of
the epistemic fallibility of individuals), we need a conception of reasonable dissent. That is,
there should be equality of intellectual authority among those within a scientific community to
propose alternative hypotheses, methodologies, and interpretations of data, as well as raise
challenges to the work of others within the scientific community, so long as that dissent relies on
reasonable, plausible, or empirically viable claims (including value judgments)” (Intemann 2011,
129). Usually, when this is the case, the scientific community lays a stronger claim to objectivity
without degenerating into anarchism11. This is in line with Longino’s discussion of scientific

11

More precisely, epistemic anarchism. This is summed up in Feyerabend’s (1987 & 2010) critique of scientific
practice as “anything goes!” Denise Russell (1983, 440) points out that Feyerabend “uses the expression ‘anything
goes’ to sum up the negative claim that there are no rational criteria of theory evaluation and the positive points
that fluid value-laden standards are used to evaluate theories, and that a plurality of methodologies, involving a
new relation between reason and practice, is most conducive to progress.” That should be the overriding principle
for Feyerabend. He argues that an abstract analysis of the relation between idea and action and a thorough
consideration of historical episodes confront us with the fact that reliance on any specific methodology in science
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criticism. She asserts that the condition for objectivity of a scientific community depends on the
ability to satisfy these criteria necessary for achieving the transformative dimension of critical
discourse: (1) Recognized avenues for criticism; (2) Shared standards; (3) Community response;
(4) Equality of intellectual authority (Longino 1990, 76-81).
These criteria are embodied in the established peer-review system. It is through the peer
review system that the transformative critical process ensures the objectivity of scientific
research, thereby weeding out skewed studies that do not meet the established standards of
scientific practice. In policy-relevant research, it seems intuitive that scientists feel the need to
inform the public about the outcomes and implications of their studies. For instance, scientists
involved in the climate change debate feel the need to inform the public on the dangers of
greenhouse gases/impending climate change and economic consequences of climate mitigation
efforts depending on which side of the debate they are. Parker (2011, 120) gives a moral
argument for communicating research findings; “In many cases, when their research findings
indicate a serious threat to humans, scientists ought to communicate those findings (and the
associated threat) to the public.” But fulfilling this moral obligation is not so simple in climate
science as a result of certain factors that give rise to complications. These include uncertainty,
multidisciplinarity, complexity and politicization (Parker 2011, 120). Thus, there is always the
danger that a lot of conflicting information on the nature of risks and consequences, some of
them based on questionable research, is thrown out to the public through the mass media,
engendering confusion and unnecessary polarization of views.
One way to avoid such danger would be for scientists to communicate only studies that
have been successfully subjected to the crucible of the critical process/peer-review system. When
is wholesomely illusive in principle. For the purposes of this work, we do not agree with the radical position of
Feyerabend, neither shall we go into any discussion of his radical ideas.
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a researcher side-steps the critical process of the collective scientific enterprise and engages the
public directly with findings that conflict with what the general consensus of the scientific
community, it engenders a manufactured controversy, confusion in the public and often leads to
a situation where the scientific community feels pressured to address “controversies” that are
unreal to a large extent. This, in other words, is EDD – the kind of dissent that impedes the
growth of knowledge. This component – the effective public dissemination of skewed research –
is a stable difference maker in the production, and an integral aspect, of EDD. This claim is
hinged on the intuition that the situation would be significantly different and less grave if the
skewed research did not find its way out of the scientific community. There would not be
confusion and the misleading idea of an existing controversy, and any resources employed
towards addressing such controversies (e.g. funding more studies on the claims of the skewed
research project) could probably have been channeled to more cogent studies.
3.2

THE EFFECTIVE DISSEMINATION OF SKEWED SCIENCE IN THE

PRODUCTION OF EDD IN CLIMATE SCIENCE
From the foregoing, we could assert that the problem with EDD is not merely about
correctness or error of the dissenting view, but the role it plays in impeding knowledge and
circumventing the way scientific practice and communication works to advance knowledge.
What makes EDD problematic is that it discountenances the accepted shared standards and
procedure of scientific criticisms of the scientific community, engages the public directly and
engenders an erroneous impression that a genuine scientific controversy exists. We should be
clear on what makes these instances cases of EDD. Firstly, results and ideas from bad scientific
practice and skewed research are effectively disseminated to the public without passing through
the accepted channels of science communication and peer review. Secondly, these ideas
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significantly diverge from the current accepted position in the scientific community, and most
likely they have been considered and rejected as lacking merit among scientists. Thus, the public
is made to think that there is a controversy on an issue that enjoys consensus among experts. This
was the case with the Marshall Institute report mentioned earlier. Oreskes and Conway (2010)
write that the report was first circulated as a “white paper” and eventually got the opportunity to
present it as a special briefing to members of top government offices and councils. Ceccarelli
(2011) refers to this phenomenon as manufactured controversy. “A scientific controversy is
‘manufactured’ in the public sphere when an arguer announces that there is an ongoing scientific
debate in the technical sphere about a matter for which there is actually an overwhelming
scientific consensus. The manufactured scientific controversy can be seen as a special type of
‘public scientific controversy’ in which ‘strategically distorted communication’ works to corrode
the democratic process” (2011, 196). For instance, as I pointed out in section one, about 97
percent of scientists who took a position explicitly or implicitly in their papers agree to the fact
of anthropogenic climate change (Cook et al. 2013). It would be a case of EDD when a scientist
gives the public the impression that this is not the case.
An Australian science writer and blogger who holds a BS in microbiology and did an
honors research on DNA, Joanne Nova, has a blog that entertains views that challenge the
climate change consensus. Being a TV personality, coupled with her “science credentials”
ensures that her blog has wide readership. One of the papers published on Nova’s blog is
“Honey, I have shrunk the consensus,”12 written by Christopher Monckton of Brenchley, a
science journalist and an “expert” in global warming issues who was a science adviser to
Margaret Thatcher, a former British PM. Monckton’s paper adopted a subtler form of argument
12

Monckton, Christopher. (2013, September). “Honey, I shrunk the Consensus.” Retrieved from URL
http://joannenova.com.au/2013/09/monckton-honey-i-shrunk-the-consensus/
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to reject the claim that there is a consensus on climate change, questioning the figures used by
Cook et al. (2013) to argue that there was a consensus. Monckton claimed that a significant
percentage of the papers that were considered in determining the level of scientific consensus did
not take any position on the debate. The problem with this line of reasoning is that it fails to state
the (very minimal) percentage of papers that implicitly or explicitly deny that anthropogenic
climate change is a fact. Also, it tends to overlook the fact that many technical scientific papers
only aim at reporting observations, data and even make hypothesis on climate records without
necessarily going into the issue of anthropogenic climate change. These are clear candidates for
EDD because we have cases of “experts” effectively disseminating skewed studies to the public.
Thirdly, a case of EDD usually involves a scenario in which the public is made to
question integrity of mainstream scientists and the scientific community unnecessarily. Oreskes
and Conway (2010) report that Fred Seitz wrote a letter published in the Wall Street Journal on
June 12, 1996, in which he made serious and misleading accusations against Ben Sander, who
was the convening lead author for the Chapter 8 of the second IPCC assessment, “Detection of
Climate Change and Attribution of Causes.” In Seitz’s words, according to Oreskes and Conway
(2010, 208); “In my more than 60 years as a member of the American scientific community,
including my services as president of the National Academy of Sciences and the American
Physical Society, I have never witnessed a more disturbing corruption of the peer-review process
than the events that led to this IPCC report.” It is no surprise that Seitz’s problem was that the
contents of that report refute the anti-anthropogenic climate change claims he supports. Such
scenario does not seem far-fetched considering that the public is one of the stakeholders in the
climate debate. The reality of climate change has a direct consequence on the current socioeconomic configuration of our society today. Apart from the huge impacts that any pro-climate
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action policy could have on the fossil fuel industries and other large corporations, the people’s
way of living as we know it today would be significantly affected too. It might seem intuitive
that people would be willing to significantly adjust their lifestyle to save the planet, but they
would probably want to be certain that there is an imminent danger to the planet. Manufactured
controversies create confusion in the public, and pro-climate scientists are likely to be dubbed
alarmists. As such scientists are forced to respond in the bid to address this manufactured
controversy and redeem the integrity of the scientific community. This could potentially be time
and resource consuming and, instead of advancing knowledge, actually impedes it.
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SECTION FOUR
4.1

S. FRED SINGER ON CLIMATE CHANGE: A CASE OF EDD?
At this point, it might seem fitting to attempt to consider a concrete instance of EDD in

climate science in a bid to drive home the arguments in the previous section. I will discuss S.
Fred Singer, a well-known climate skeptic, and try to argue that his position is a clear candidate
for EDD in climate science.
S. Fred Singer is an atmospheric physicist and a well-known climate skeptic. He rejects
the scientific consensus on climate change. Singer considers himself a skeptic,
contradistinguished from those he refers to as warmistas (pro-climate change/global warming
scientists) and deniers (climate change deniers). In an article he published in the American
Thinker, he wrote; “In principle, every true scientist must be a skeptic. That’s how we’re trained;
we question experiments, and we question theories. We try to repeat or independently derive
what we read in publications—just to make sure that no mistakes have been made… many
skeptics go along with the general conclusion of the warmistas but simply claim that the human
contribution is not as large as indicated by climate models. But at the same time, they join with
deniers in opposing drastic efforts to mitigate greenhouse (GH) gas emissions.”13
Several different (and in some way contradictory) themes seem to run through Singer’s
views. His arguments are laced with claims that warn of the economic consequences of climate
mitigation. He also tends to argue in a book, Unstoppable Global Warming, that the global
warming recorded is a result of the activity of the sun, and not human influence. (Singer, 2006).

13
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Also, he sometimes seemed to claim that the climate has not warmed in the past three decades.14
I shall not concern myself with an evaluation or analysis of these claims. However, my analysis
of his case as a possible candidate of EDD will be based on his self-characterization as a skeptic
who questions the validity of climate models and model predictions.
He is the founder and president of the Science and Environmental Policy Project (SEPP),
a research group he founded in 1990 to combat the growing consensus among scientists on the
issue of global warming. Scheuering (2014, 125) reports that SEPP has received grants from
ExxonMobil, and that Singer has been a paid consultant for some of the largest energy
corporations including ExxonMobil, ARCO, Shell Oil Company, Sun Oil Company and Unocal
Company. This evident affiliation with the fossil fuel industry is an important factor, and
arguably could have played a very crucial role in the research Singer produces. That being said, I
do not think the presence of industry financing is enough to discredit Singer’s research.
My claim is that there is the need to look beyond the intrusion of such non-epistemic
factors such as industry financing. Thus, in the case of Singer, I argue that beyond these nonepistemic factors, there are other identifiable factors that clearly make him a clear candidate for
EDD. These factors fall under the two difference makers in the production of EDD: skewed
research and effective public dissemination; and what follows is my trying to provide arguments
for my claim.
The first factor has to do with the production of skewed research. Singer’s research which
counters the consensus position of scientists has been shown to be flawed. Scheuering (2014)
reports that Singer repeatedly criticized and rejected the computer model which is the major
research tool available to climate scientists. And in a bid to drive home his criticism, he used the
computer models that scientists use in predicting global warming and ran his own analysis. His
14
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analysis for the period between 1950 and 1980 came up with temperatures that deviated from the
actual temperatures for the same period. Hence he argued that climate models are faulty and that
their prediction of global warming is wrong. He published his findings in his regular column for
the Washington Times on 29 November 1994 in a paper entitled “Climate Claims wither under
the Luminous Lights of Science.”
Now the problem with this claim, according to Elrich et al (1996) as reported by
Scheuering (2014, 122), is that Singer “had neglected to adjust his numbers to compensate for
the cooling effects of aerosols in the atmosphere, and he also failed to include the actual
temperatures of the 1980s, collectively the warmest years in recorded history up to that point.” In
the words of Elrich (1996, 39), “If the models had been properly represented and the actual
record taken into the 1990s, the predictions would have been shown to be reasonably accurate.”
From this, it can be argued that Singer cherry-picked his data in a bid to advance a predetermined
conclusion; this makes his research questionable.
Also, there is some cherry-picking in Singer’s choice of data collection method. He
prefers to use the data set from satellite measurements to analyze global temperature. Criticizing
the IPCC report in which 2500 scientists issued a monumental statement that the balance of
evidence suggests a discernible human influence on global climate, Singer argued that “(T)he
summary does not mention that the satellite data – the only truly global measurements, available
since 1979 – show no warming at all, but actually a slight cooling” (Singer 1996, 581). However,
Scheuering (2014, 123) reports that Singer’s critics identified some very important flaws in his
argument. Firstly, it has been discovered that the differences in measurement from the gradual
decay of satellite orbits were not taken into account by satellite readings. When this factor is
taken into consideration, the readings indicate the same warming trend as recorded with surface
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thermometers. Secondly, weather satellite record only goes back to 1979, which is considered
too short to show long-term trends. We might consider this to be a case of an unacceptable direct
role for values since Singer’s interpretation of climate data was aimed at justifying his
preconceived conclusion. However, this line of reasoning must be hinged on clearly identifying
what non-epistemic factors (such as industry funding) influenced Singer’s study and how that
was the case. The problem would be that science is not in the business of mind-reading, and it
might be difficult to demonstrate undoubtedly that such he was a mere big-money stooge posing
as a skeptic. Fortunately, the scientific community does not have to resolve this quagmire before
ascertaining that Singer’s research was simple bad science.
When it comes to the issue of effective public dissemination of flawed research, we see
that Singer is no stranger to the art of reaching out to the public. Scheuering (2014, 121) writes
that when the Earth Summit of 1992 in Rio de Janeiro took center stage, “Singer began making
frequent pronouncements in newspapers and magazines and on radio programs, spreading
doubts about its validity. His Ph.D. credentials carried significant amount of weight, and his
arguments generated significant skepticism among a public that has remained relatively
uninformed about the issue. Even people interested in global climate change don’t purchase the
computer models that predict warming trends, and very few people actually read journals of
atmospheric physics or IPCC reports. Popular magazines, evening news, and radio talk shows
therefore become the source of authority for a wide audience, and Singer, who writes and
speaks frequently through these media outlets, can reach millions of people” (emphasis mine).
Singer has published his views in magazines like the The New York Times (e.g.
September 28, 1993), Washington Post (e.g. October 1, 1967), American Thinker (e.g. February
19, 2011), The Daily Telegraph (interview; November 19, 2009), Financial Times (e.g.
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November 26, 2003), among others. He has also given interviews on television stations like the
PBS. At first blush, it might seem that there is nothing wrong publishing in these media outlets.
However, the problem is that Singer’s views which he published through these media have been
discredited by the scientific community. This is a case of a scientist rigging the system by
engaging the public directly instead of publishing his research in peer-reviewed journals. Even
though Singer has published a number of books on climate change and global warming,
Scheuering (2014, 125) reports that a Representative in the U.S. Congress, Lynn Rivers,
“questioned his credibility because he had not been able to publish any work in a peer-reviewed
scientific journal (except one technical comment) for the previous fifteen years. Singer did not
deny the charges.”
In sum, there is no doubt that there are significant non-epistemic factors that are
associated with, and played a role in the case of, Fred Singer. However, my claim is that the
reason why his case is a candidate for EDD in climate science is that it is an instance of bad
science that was effectively disseminated to the public. It is likely the case that some kind of
economic interest and industry funding or financing were involved, and these might have played
significant roles in the production of EDD in his case. But, as Le Bihan and Amadi
(forthcoming) argue, these factors are not the stable factors that result in the production of EDD.
Instead, the presence of flawed research which he effectively publicized via unorthodox means
constitutes the relevant criteria for EDD.
Works Cited
1. Ehrlich, P. R., Ehrlich, A. H., & Pimm, S. (1996). Betrayal of science and
reason. Nature, 383(6600), 494-494.
2. Scheuering, R. W. (2004). Shapers of the great debate on conservation: a biographical
dictionary (No. 4). Greenwood Publishing Group.
3. Singer, S. F. (2006). Unstoppable global warming: every 1,500 years. Rowman &
Littlefield.
63

4. Singer, S. F. (February 2, 1996). “Climate Change and Consensus.” Letter to Science.
Vol. 271. 581-582.

64

CONCLUSION
Our discussions so far show that it seems plausible to assert that the science-policy
interface is now such that non-epistemic considerations tend to have considerable bearing on the
outcome of scientific research. The high degree and nature of the uncertainties in policy-relevant
science such as climate science leave room for tinkering and maneuvering of the available data
and interpretation to suit intended outcome or preconceived prejudice. This problem is made
more complicated because the nature of climate science as a policy-relevant science entails that
the various stakeholders (including the public) are eager to get answers from scientists. The
established closed peer-review system might be effective in weeding out what gets published in
scientific journals, but cannot determine what gets out to the public through the mass media.
To combat the problem of EDD, it is necessary to identify and properly characterize the
causal structure of the factors involved. The characterization of EDD and how it plays out in
climate science is partly an attempt at clarifying the role of non-epistemic considerations in
scientific practice. It is my submission that what counts as EDD is when skewed research is
effectively disseminated to the public, in other words, well publicized bad science, leading to
manufactured controversies and the consequences that follow from this. In climate science, EDD
mostly involves romanticizing the challenges in the science in ways that involve a biased
collection and use of data, as well as any skewed research or malpractice aimed at advancing a
particular view point (in this case, the denial of climate change), and then engaging the public
directly using effective mass media platforms to engender a manufactured controversy.
However, it is not clear that the non-epistemic factors leading to a case of bad research are
necessarily problematic, and also in some cases, it seems not to be an easy task clarifying what
roles these values played in the production of skewed science. As such, the role of the intrusion
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of non-epistemic values in the production of EDD is contingent; there is the need to look beyond
them in the evaluation of dissent in climate science. The production of skewed research is a
stable factor – the community of scientists can adjudge a research project to be skewed without
having to determine the legitimacy or otherwise of the non-epistemic factors involved. Thus, it is
possible that non-epistemic considerations play a role in this scenario, but their roles are largely
contingent. The stable difference makers are the production of skewed research and the effective
dissemination of this bad science to the public.
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